display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
| 5220 | Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Deliberation is not concerned with particular facts, such as 'is it a loaf?' or 'is it properly cooked?'; these are matters of sense-perception. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112b33) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be Aristotle's commitment to direct cognition through perception, though if pressed he might concede that concepts (such as 'cooked') are involved in perception. |
| 22141 | It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If we both refute the objections and leave the common opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145b05), quoted by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 3 | |
| A reaction: This quotation is a sacred text for philosophers who place a high value on the consensus of thinking among the majority of people. I hate it when philosophers hijack an ordinary word and assign it a different meaning. |
| 95 | If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What everyone believes is so. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1173a01) | |
| A reaction: Would you think me terribly unfashionable if I agreed with this? Huge numbers of people can be wrong, but if 'everyone' believes something it seems crazy to go against it. |
| 79 | Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Intuition apprehends the definitions which cannot be logically demonstrated. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1142a25) | |
| A reaction: Nice to see that (like me) he has a positive view of intuition. I'm not sure how you would 'prove' a definition of the hidden nature of a thing (which is usually taken to be hidden). |