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3 ideas
| 24138 | Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: What we believe the most, everything a priori, is not for that reason more certain, just because it is so strongly believed. Rather, it is perhaps a consequence of the condition for the existence of our species. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[307]) | |
| A reaction: This is in defiance of Leibniz and Kant. His proposed explanation is not very convincing. Russell agreed with Nietzsche. |
| 24130 | An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Belief is already present in every sense impression going back to the very moment it begins: a kind of Yes-saying first intellectual activity! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[168]) | |
| A reaction: He seems right that there is an intrinsic commitment to believing sense impressions, even in animals. Presumably more of a default setting than an intellectual choice. |
| 18989 | Pragmatism accepts any hypothesis which has useful consequences [James] |
| Full Idea: On pragmatic principles we cannot reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow from it. | |
| From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 8) | |
| A reaction: Most governments seem to find lies more useful than the truth. Maybe most children are better off not knowing the truth about their parents. It might be disastrous to know the truth about what other people are thinking. Is 'useful but false' meaningful? |