Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Lectures 1930-32 (student notes)' and 'Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous'
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11 ideas
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
3933
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Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley]
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
3934
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A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley]
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3935
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The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley]
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3937
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'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley]
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3940
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Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley]
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
3957
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Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley]
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
18280
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We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein]
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
18729
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Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein]
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
3953
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Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley]
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
3938
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Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley]
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12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
18734
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If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein]
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