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Ideas for 'Perception', 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority' and 'Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed)'

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29 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
6502 Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H]
6513 Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
12478 A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
12481 Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes [Locke]
12546 We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together [Locke]
6512 Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H]
15989 Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Locke, by Alexander,P]
15971 Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
6725 Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Locke, by Berkeley]
15982 Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Locke, by Alexander,P]
12479 Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number [Locke]
12480 Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't [Locke]
7049 In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Locke, by Heil]
6497 We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
15973 In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P]
7050 I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Locke, by Heil]
15979 Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object [Locke]
6494 If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H]
6499 Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H]
6500 If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
6484 Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
6508 Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
6480 Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H]
6482 For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
6505 Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
12482 Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
6506 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H]
6507 Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H]
6511 If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H]