Combining Texts

Ideas for '74: Reply to Colotes', 'New Essays on Human Understanding' and 'Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations)'

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18 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz]
Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz]
Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz]
All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege]
A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz]
We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz]
The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge]