Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Idealism: a critical survey', 'The Blue and Brown Notebooks' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses'

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4 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid]
     Full Idea: To believe without evidence is a weakness which every man is concerned to avoid, and which every man wishes to avoid.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785], 20)
     A reaction: It seems to be very common, though, for people to believe things on incredibly flimsy evidence, if they find the belief appealing. This is close to Clifford's Principle, but not quite as dogmatic.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
     Full Idea: I think it is wrong to tie down the advocates of the coherence theory to a precise definition. ...It would be altogether unreasonable to demand that the moral ideal should be exhaustively defined, and the same may be true of the ideal of thought.
     From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.231), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 7.6
     A reaction: I strongly agree. It is not a council of despair. I think the criteria of coherence can be articulated quite well (e.g by Thagard), and the virtues of enquiry can also be quite well specified (e.g. by Zagzebski). Very dissimilar evidence must cohere.
If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid]
     Full Idea: If Nature gives us information of things that concern us, by other means that by reasoning, reason itself will direct us to receive that information with thankfulness, and to make the best use of it.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785], 20)
     A reaction: This is more of a claim than an argument, but it is hard to see how anything could even be seen as evidence if some sort of rational judgement has not been made. The clever detective sees which facts are evidence.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
     Full Idea: Without a detailed account, coherence is reduced to the mere muttering of the word 'coherence', which can be interpreted so as to cover all arguments, but only by making its meaning so wide as to rob it of almost all significance.
     From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.246), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2
     A reaction: I'm a fan of coherence, but it is a placeholder, involving no intrinsic or detailed theory. I just think it points to the reality of how we make judgements, especially practical ones. We can categorise the inputs, and explain the required virtues.