display all the ideas for this combination of texts
18 ideas
10339 | Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Foundationalists place the foundations of knowledge at a point where they are in principle accessible only to the individual knower. They cannot be 'shared' with another person, or with oneself at a later time. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: Kusch is defending an extremely social view of knowledge. Being private to an individual may just he an unfortunate epistemological fact. Being unavailable even to one's later self seems a real problem for foundational certainty. |
10331 | Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Testimony must be reliable since its deliveries cohere both with input from other information routes in the formation of single beliefs, and with other types of beliefs in the formation of systems of belief. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: Kusch criticises this view (credited to C.A.J. Coady 1992) as too individualistic , but it sounds to me dead right. I take a major appeal of the coherence account of justification to be its capacity to extend seamlessly out into external testimony. |
10338 | The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch] |
Full Idea: The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: I endorse this idea, which endorses Davidson's slogan on the subject. The key thought is that a 'pure' sensation is uninterpreted, and so cannot justify anything. It is only once it generates a proposition that it can justify. But McDowell 1994. |
10340 | Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Individualistic versions of coherentism assume that a belief is justified if it fits with all, or most, of my contemporaneous beliefs. But who has access to that totality? Who can judge my assessment? From what position could it be judged? | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Though I agree with Kusch on the social aspect of coherence, I don't think these are major criticisms. Who can access, or critically evaluate a society's body of supposedly coherent beliefs? We just do our best. |
10345 | Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Standard forms of coherentism are unable to account for normativity, because of their common individualism. Normativity cannot be generated within the isolated individual, or in the causal interaction between world and individual mind. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: This thought leads to belief in rationalism and the a priori, not (as Kusch hopes) to the social dimension. How can social normativity get off the ground if there is none of it to be found in individuals? The criteria of coherence seem to be given. |
10350 | Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Assessments of causal routes are specific to cultures, and thus not beyond dialectical justification. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This is a good defence of the social and communitarian view against those who are trying to be thoroughly naturalistic and physicalist by relying entirely on causal processes for all explanation, even though I sympathise with such naturalism. |
10343 | Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Process reliabilism is sometimes subsumed under the label 'virtue epistemology', so that processes are 'epistemically virtuous' if they lead mostly to true beliefs. The 'intellectual virtues' here are perception, memory or reasoning. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: I am shocked that 'intellectual virtue' should be hijacked by reliabilists, suggesting that it even applies to a good clock. I like the Aristotelian idea that sound knowledge rests on qualities of character in the knower - including social qualities. |
10341 | Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch] |
Full Idea: How a claim (about an X-ray) needs to be justified depends on whether one is confronted by a group of laypersons, or of experts, and is prescribed by one's social role. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: I think this is exactly right. I cannot think of any absolute criterion for justification which doesn't play straight into the hands of sceptics. Final and certain justification is an incoherent notion. But I am a little more individualistic than Kusch. |
10334 | Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This is very thought-provoking. A key concept linking the two would be 'respect'. Consider also 'experts'. |
10324 | Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Testimony is not just a means of transmission of complete items of knowledge from and to an individual. Testimony is almost always generative of knowledge. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear how my testimony could fail to be knowledge for me, but become knowledge just because I pass it to you. I might understand what I say better than you did. When fools pool their testimony, presumably not much knowledge results. |
10327 | Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Reductionalists about testimony are foundationalists by temperament. ...Their project amounts to justifying our testimonial beliefs in terms of perceptions, memories and inferences. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: Kusch wants to claim that the sharing of testimony is the means by which knowledge is created. My line is something like knowledge being founded on a social coherence, which is an extension of internal individual coherence. |
10329 | Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch] |
Full Idea: How can we hope to reduce testimony to perception if the way we perceive the world is to a considerable extent shaped by concepts and categories that we have learned from others? | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: To me this sounds like good support for coherentism, the benign circle between my reason, my experience, and the testimony and reason of others. Asking how the circle could get started shows ignorance of biology. |
10330 | A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch] |
Full Idea: It can be argued that testimony is non-reductive because it relies on the fact that whatever is intelligible is likely to come from a rational source, and that rational sources, by their very nature, tend towards the truth. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 4 n7) | |
A reaction: [He cites Tyler Burge 1993, 1997] If this makes testimony non-reductive, how would one assess whether the testimony is 'intelligible'? |
10325 | Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch] |
Full Idea: To believe that testimony needs a general vindication is itself an expression of individualism. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: Kusch is a spokesman for Communitarian Epistemology. Surely we are allowed to identify the criteria for what makes a good witness? Ask a policeman. |
10336 | Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch] |
Full Idea: The powerless in society are not usually taken to be trustworthy witnesses even when it comes to providing information about their own lives. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This is where epistemology shades off into politics and the writings of Foucault. |
10335 | Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Many myths about the lonely scientific genius underwrite epistemological individualism. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: They all actually say that they 'stood on the shoulders of giants', and they are invariably immersed in the contemporary researches of teams of like-minded people. How surprised were the really expert contemporaries by Newton, Einstein, Gödel? |
10323 | Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch] |
Full Idea: I propose 'communitarian epistemology' - claiming first that the term 'knowledge' marks a social status, and is dependent on the existence of communities, and second that this social status is typically granted to groups of people. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: I find this very congenial, though Kusch goes a little far when he claims that knowledge is largely created by social groups. He allows that Robinson Crusoe might have knowledge of his island, but can't give a decent account of it. |
10348 | Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Coming to convince myself is actually to form a pretend communal belief with pretend others, ..which is clearly parasitic on the case where the others are real. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This slightly desperate move is a way for 'communitarian' epistemologists to deal with Robinson Crusoe cases. I think Kusch is right, but it is a bit hard to prove that this is what is 'actually' going on. |