display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 3597 | Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951], §152), quoted by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: A nice metaphor for the way in which axioms are derived. It is also close to Quine's metaphor of the 'net' of understanding, with the centre area 'standing fast'. Not neat and tidy, though. |
| 16279 | General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Causal accounts of knowledge are all very well in their place, but if they are put forward as general theories, then mathematics refutes them. | |
| From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: You might have some sort of notion of an abstraction from causation which mimicked it in the mathematics case. Lots of things seem to be 'forced' in mathematics. Call it 'ersatz causation'. Necessities are enforcers. |
| 3596 | Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Wittgenstein remarked that if you tried to doubt everything, you would not get as far as doubting anything. | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.14 |