Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey' and 'Contingent Identity'

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3 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
     Full Idea: It is impossible that my present belief that it will rain tomorrow is caused by its raining tomorrow.
     From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 22.4)
     A reaction: This doesn't demolish a causal account of belief. It would be very surprising if I were to believe it was going to rain tomorrow for no cause whatsoever. That would be irrational.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton]
     Full Idea: If the evidence for p is q, and that is the only evidence there is or can be, then 'p' means q. Hence there is no gap between evidence and conclusion, and the sceptical problem does not arise.
     From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 3.2)
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton]
     Full Idea: A writer who says that there are no truths, or that all truth is 'merely relative', is asking you not to believe him. So don't.
     From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 1.1)