Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'Outlines of Pyrrhonism' and 'Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues'

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18 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa]
     Full Idea: There is a difference between having just an indexical concept which one can apply to a perceptual characteristic (just saying 'this is thus'), and having a thicker perceptual concept of that characteristic.
     From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.2)
     A reaction: Both of these, of course, would precede any categorial concepts that enabled one to identify the characteristic or the object. This is a ladder foundationalists must climb if they are to reach the cellar of basic beliefs.
Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa]
     Full Idea: Are foundationally justified beliefs perhaps those that result from attending to our experience and to features of it or in it?
     From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.3)
     A reaction: A promising suggestion. I do think our ideas acquire a different epistmological status once we have given them our full attention, though is that merely full consciousness, or full thoughtful evaluation? The latter I take to be what matters. Cf Idea 2414.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa]
     Full Idea: Some intrinsic features of our thoughts are attributable to them directly, or foundationally, while others are attributable only based on counting or inference.
     From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.5)
     A reaction: In practice the brain combines the two at a speed which makes the distinction impossible. I'll show you ten dot-patterns: you pick out the sixer. The foundationalist problem is that only those drained of meaning could be foundational.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa]
     Full Idea: Much of our propositional knowledge is not easily formulable, as when a witness looking at a police lineup may know what the culprit's face looks like.
     From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.1)
     A reaction: This is actually a very helpful defence of foundationalism, because it shows that we will accept perceptual experiences as knowledge when they are not expressed as explicit propositions. Davidson (Idea 8801), for example, must deal with this difficulty.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa]
     Full Idea: One's beliefs can be comprehensively coherent without amounting to knowledge.
     From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.6)
     A reaction: Beliefs that are fully foundational or reliably sourced may also fail to be knowledge. I take it that any epistemological theory must be fallibilist (Idea 6898). Rational coherentism will clearly be sensitive to error.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The main basic principle of the sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.12)
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The necks of doves appear different in hue according to the differences in the angle of inclination.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.120)
The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The same oar seems bent when in the water but straight when out of the water.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.119)
The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.32)
If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: When we press the eyeball at one side the forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong and narrow.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.47)
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: We cannot judge between our own impressions and those of other animals, because we ourselves are involved in the dispute.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.59)
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The same water which seems very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.101)
Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Actions which seem shameful to us when sober do not seem shameful when drunk.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.109)
If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: A man with touch, taste and smell, but no hearing or sight, will assume nothing audible or visible exists, so maybe an apple has qualities which we have no senses to perceive.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.96)
Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Health is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, and sickness is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so we must give credence to the natural perceptions of the sick.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.103)
If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The enjoyment of different things is an indication that we get varying impressions from the underlying objects.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.80)
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: It is a shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but among some of the barbarians, such as the Syrians, it is a token of nobility.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.203)
Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Even among practices on which all known cultures are agreed, disagreement about them may possibly exist amongst some of the nations which are unknown to us.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.234)