Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'The Ethics' and 'Goodness and Choice'

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6 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism

4835	Anyone who knows, must know that they know, and even know that they know that they know.. [Spinoza]
	Full Idea: If a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to infinity.
	From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 21)
	A reaction: A delightfully bold claim! This is 'super internalism', but it seems to require that we must be certain in order to know, whereas I think my own view is internalist but 'fallibilist' - I know, while admitting I could be wrong.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification

6598	We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
	Full Idea: It is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5
	A reaction: This very sensible and interesting remark hovers somewhere between empiricism and pragmatism. Fogelin very persuasively builds his account of knowledge on it. The key point is that we hardly ever choose what to believe. See Idea 2454.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs

6944	Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
	Full Idea: It is a common idea that demonstration must rest on indubitable propositions, either first principles of a general nature, or first sensations; but actual demonstration is completely satisfactory if it starts from propositions free from all actual doubt.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
	A reaction: Another nice example of Peirce focusing on the practical business of thinking, rather than abstract theory. I agree with this approach, that explanation and proof do not aim at perfection and indubitability, but at what satisfies a critical mind.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

20308	Encounters with things confuse the mind, and internal comparisons bring clarity [Spinoza]
	Full Idea: The mind has only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and external bodies, as long as it is perceived from fortuitous encounters with things, ...and not internally, from the agreements, differences and oppositions of a number of things at once.
	From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 29s)
	A reaction: [compressed] This is a very nice expression of the commitment to coherence as justification, typical of the rationalist view of things. Empiricists are trapped in an excessively atomistic concept of knowledge (one impression or sense datum at a time).

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

6948	Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
	Full Idea: To satisfy our doubts it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.18)
	A reaction: This may be the single most important idea in pragmatism and in the philosophy of science. See Fodor on experiments (Idea 2455). Put the question to nature. The essential aim is to be passive in our beliefs - just let reality form them.

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique

6945	Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
	Full Idea: Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
	A reaction: This is the way Peirce's pragmatism, which deals with how real thinking actually works (rather than abstract logic), deals with scepticism. However, there is a borderline where almost everyone is satisfied, but the very wise person remains sceptical.