Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'Papers of 1906' and 'The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge'

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6 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues

12413	A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher]
	Full Idea: A 'warrant' refers to those processes which produce belief 'in the right way': X knows that p iff p, and X believes that p, and X's belief that p was produced by a process which is a warrant for it.
	From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 01.2)
	A reaction: That is, a 'warrant' is a justification which makes a belief acceptable as knowledge. Traditionally, warrants give you certainty (and are, consequently, rather hard to find). I would say, in the modern way, that warrants are agreed by social convention.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility

20473	If experiential can defeat a belief, then its justification depends on the defeater's absence [Kitcher, by Casullo]
	Full Idea: According to Kitcher, if experiential evidence can defeat someone's justification for a belief, then their justification depends on the absence of that experiential evidence.
	From: report of Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], p.89) by Albert Casullo - A Priori Knowledge 2.3
	A reaction: Sounds implausible. There are trillions of possible defeaters for most beliefs, but to say they literally depend on trillions of absences seems a very odd way of seeing the situation

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification

6598	We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
	Full Idea: It is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5
	A reaction: This very sensible and interesting remark hovers somewhere between empiricism and pragmatism. Fogelin very persuasively builds his account of knowledge on it. The key point is that we hardly ever choose what to believe. See Idea 2454.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs

6944	Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
	Full Idea: It is a common idea that demonstration must rest on indubitable propositions, either first principles of a general nature, or first sensations; but actual demonstration is completely satisfactory if it starts from propositions free from all actual doubt.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
	A reaction: Another nice example of Peirce focusing on the practical business of thinking, rather than abstract theory. I agree with this approach, that explanation and proof do not aim at perfection and indubitability, but at what satisfies a critical mind.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

6948	Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
	Full Idea: To satisfy our doubts it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.18)
	A reaction: This may be the single most important idea in pragmatism and in the philosophy of science. See Fodor on experiments (Idea 2455). Put the question to nature. The essential aim is to be passive in our beliefs - just let reality form them.

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique

6945	Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
	Full Idea: Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
	A reaction: This is the way Peirce's pragmatism, which deals with how real thinking actually works (rather than abstract logic), deals with scepticism. However, there is a borderline where almost everyone is satisfied, but the very wise person remains sceptical.