6944
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Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
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Full Idea:
It is a common idea that demonstration must rest on indubitable propositions, either first principles of a general nature, or first sensations; but actual demonstration is completely satisfactory if it starts from propositions free from all actual doubt.
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From:
Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
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A reaction:
Another nice example of Peirce focusing on the practical business of thinking, rather than abstract theory. I agree with this approach, that explanation and proof do not aim at perfection and indubitability, but at what satisfies a critical mind.
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4582
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Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl]
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Full Idea:
Sentence are held to be basic because they are self-evident or 'cataleptic' (Stoics), or rooted in sense data (positivists), or grasped by intuition (Platonists), or revealed by God, or grasped by faculties certified by God (Descartes).
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From:
J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §1.01)
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A reaction:
These are a bit blurred. Isn't intuition self-evident? Isn't divine guarantee a type of revelation? How about reason, experience or authority?
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6945
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Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
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Full Idea:
Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose.
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From:
Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
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A reaction:
This is the way Peirce's pragmatism, which deals with how real thinking actually works (rather than abstract logic), deals with scepticism. However, there is a borderline where almost everyone is satisfied, but the very wise person remains sceptical.
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