Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics' and 'Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey'

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2 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton]
     Full Idea: If the evidence for p is q, and that is the only evidence there is or can be, then 'p' means q. Hence there is no gap between evidence and conclusion, and the sceptical problem does not arise.
     From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 3.2)
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
     A reaction: This is the way Peirce's pragmatism, which deals with how real thinking actually works (rather than abstract logic), deals with scepticism. However, there is a borderline where almost everyone is satisfied, but the very wise person remains sceptical.