Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Realistic Rationalism', 'Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed)' and 'Walking the Tightrope of Reason'

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6 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility

6589	Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin]
	Full Idea: In general a knowledge claim is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated.
	From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
	A reaction: The problem here is what is 'relevant'. Fogelin's example is 'Are you sure the suspect doesn't have a twin brother?' If virtual reality is relevant, most knowledge is defeated. Certainly, imaginative people feel that they know less than others.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

6596	For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin]
	Full Idea: Coherentists argue that if the circle of justifications is big enough, rich enough, coherent enough, and so on, then there is nothing wrong circularity.
	From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
	A reaction: There must always be something wrong with circularity, and no god would put up with it, but we might have to. Of course, two pieces of evidence might be unconnected, such as an equation and an observation.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism

6597	A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin]
	Full Idea: One rule for the justification of knowledge might be: Do not raise the level of scrutiny in the absence of a particular reason that triggers it.
	From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
	A reaction: That won't decide the appropriate level of scrutiny from which to start. One of my maxims is 'don't set the bar too high', but it seems tough that one should have to justify moving it. The early scientists tried raising it, and were amazed by the results.

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism

6588	Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin]
	Full Idea: The three forms of scepticism are cartesian, Humean and Pyrrhonian. The first challenges belief by inventing sceptical scenarios; the second doubts the future; the third aims to suspend belief.
	From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
	A reaction: A standard distinction is made between methodological and global scepticism. The former seems to be Cartesian, and the latter Pyrrhonian. The interest here is see Hume placed in a distinctive category, because of his views on induction.

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique

6590	Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin]
	Full Idea: Sceptical scenarios deal in wildly remote defeating possibilities, so that the level of scrutiny becomes unrestrictedly high, and they also usually deal with defeators that are in principle ineliminable.
	From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
	A reaction: The question of how high we 'set the bar' seems to me central to epistemology. There is clearly an element of social negotiation involved, centring on what is appropriate. If, though, scepticism is 'ineliminable', we must face up to that.

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism

6583	Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin]
	Full Idea: We reach radical perspectivism by replacing Kant's single, necessary categorial scheme with a plurality of competing categorial schemes.
	From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3)
	A reaction: It certainly looks as if Kant sent us down a slippery slope into the dafter aspects of twentieth century relativism. The best antidote I know of is Davidson's (e.g. Idea 6398). But then it seems unimaginative to say that only one scheme is possible.