Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist' and 'A Structural Account of Mathematics'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts

---

2 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

3753	Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske]
	Full Idea: The driving force behind foundationalism has always been the threat of an infinite regress.
	From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.III Int)
	A reaction: You could just live with the regress (Peter Klein), or say that the regress fades away, or that it is cut off by social epistemological convention, or the regress circles round and rejoins.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique

3754	Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske]
	Full Idea: If sense experiences are non-epistemic they may be infallible, but they are unsuitable for providing the foundations for other beliefs.
	From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.III Int)
	A reaction: If we experience flashing lights in the retina, or an afterimage, we don't think we are seeing objects, so why is normal perception different? Ans: because it is supported by judgement.