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3 ideas
8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations are not beliefs or propositional attitudes. The relation must be causal. Sensations cause some beliefs, but they do not show why the belief is justified. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], p.157) | |
A reaction: This is, I am beginning to think, the single most important idea in the whole of modern epistemology. Animals have beliefs caused in this way, and because they only have simple beliefs about immediate things, most of their beliefs are true. |
8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
Full Idea: What distinguishes a coherence theory of justification is simply the claim that nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], p.156) | |
A reaction: I think I agree fully with this. Red patches and headaches I count as evidence rather than as reasons. Since a red patch can be hallucinatory, and a headache can be dreamed, they can't possibly embody true propositions without critical evaluation. |
9126 | Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Bayesians demonstrate that a self-correcting agent can build an imposing edifice of near-certain knowledge from numerous beliefs that are only slightly more probable than not. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 6.1) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as highly significant for the coherence account of justification, even if one is sceptical about the arithmetical approach to belief of Bayesianism. It seems obvious that lots of quite likely facts build towards certainty, Watson. |