Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Ways of Worldmaking', 'On the Nature of the Universe' and 'Causality and Determinism'

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2 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations

5697	The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius]
	Full Idea: If a belief resting directly on the foundation of the senses is not valid, there will be no standard to which we can refer any doubt on obscure questions for rational confirmation.
	From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.422)
	A reaction: A classic statement of empiricist foundationalism. The Epicureans don't appear to have any time for a priori truths at all. I wonder if they settled mathematical disputes by counting objects and drawing diagrams?

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

17660	Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
	Full Idea: Discovery often amounts, as when I place a piece in a jigsaw puzzle, not to arrival at a proposition for declaration or defense, but to finding a fit.
	From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.7)
	A reaction: I find Goodman's views here pretty alien, but I like this bit. Coherence really rocks.