display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
6370 | Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: There are two major kinds of externalist theory in the literature - probabilism (which expresses justification in terms of probability of the belief being true), and reliabilism (which refers to the probability of the cognitive processes being right). | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.1) | |
A reaction: A useful clarification. Reliabilism has an obvious problem, that a process can be reliable, but only luckily correct on this occasion (a clock which has, unusually, stopped). A ghost is more probably there if I believe in ghosts. |
6358 | One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: If I fall flat on my back running to a class, my belief that I was late for class may cause me to have the belief that there are birds in the trees, but I do not believe the latter on the basis of the former. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.1) | |
A reaction: A nice example, which fairly conclusively demolishes any causal theory of justification. My example is believing correctly that the phone ring is from mother, because she said she would call. Maybe causation is needed somewhere in the right theory. |
12893 | Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: Contextualism explains the appeal of sceptical arguments by allowing that the claims of the sceptic are true, relative to the very strict context in which they are made. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.57) | |
A reaction: This strikes me a right. I've always thought that global scepticism must be conceded if we are being very strict indeed about justification, but also that it is ridiculous to be that strict. So the epistemological question is 'How strict should we be?' |
12896 | Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: The context-sensitivity of knowledge is inherited from one of its components, i.e. justification. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.68) | |
A reaction: I think this is exactly right - that there is nothing relative or contextual about what is actually true, or what someone believes, but knowleddge is wholly relative because it rests on shifting standards of justification. |
12894 | There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: The problem for invariantism is that competent speakers, under sceptical pressure, tend to deny that we know even the most conspicuous facts of perception, the clearest memories etc. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.58) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Idea 12892. This seems to me a strong response to the rather weak invariantist case (that there is 'really and truly' only one invariant standard for knowledge). Full strength scepticism about everything demolishes all knowledge. |