Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'The Republic' and 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal'

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2 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
True belief without knowledge is like blind people on the right road [Plato]
     Full Idea: Don't people who have a correct belief but no knowledge strike you as exactly like blind people who happen to be taking the right road?
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 506c)
     A reaction: Good. I love the style of this. Most philosophical points can be made in one concise sentence, and it is only the industry of journals and academe that forces points to be extended so much.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
     Full Idea: The 'defeasibility' approach says that having knowledge requires, in addition to justified true belief, there being no true information which, if learned, would result in the person in question no longer being justified in believing the claim.
     From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal [2005], 'Epistemic')
     A reaction: I take this to be an externalist view, since it depends on information of which the cognizer may be unaware. A defeater may yet have an undiscovered counter-defeater. The only real defeater is the falsehood of the proposition.