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3 ideas
5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If a belief resting directly on the foundation of the senses is not valid, there will be no standard to which we can refer any doubt on obscure questions for rational confirmation. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.422) | |
A reaction: A classic statement of empiricist foundationalism. The Epicureans don't appear to have any time for a priori truths at all. I wonder if they settled mathematical disputes by counting objects and drawing diagrams? |
303 | Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato] |
Full Idea: If each of you says how many teeth the other has, and when they are counted we find you do know, we will believe your other claims as well. | |
From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 294c) | |
A reaction: This is the clairvoyant problem for reliabilism, if truth is delivered for no apparent reason. Useful, but hardly knowledge. HOW did you know the number of teeth? |
5727 | Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Paradoxical experiences (such a dreams and illusions) cannot shake our faith in the senses. Most of the illusion is due to the mental assumptions we ourselves superimpose, so that things not perceived by the senses pass for perceptions. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.462) | |
A reaction: Some misinterpretations of the senses, such as thinking a square tower round, are the result of foolish lack of judgement, but actual delusions within the senses, such as a ringing in the ears, or a pain in a amputated leg, seem like real sense failures. |