display all the ideas for this combination of texts
23 ideas
6595 | If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Against the Stoics, the Pyrrhonians argued that if someone presents a criterion of truth, then it will be important to determine whether it is the correct criterion. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
A reaction: Hence Davidson says that attempts to define truth are 'folly'. If something has to be taken as basic, then truth seems a good candidate (since, for example, logical operators could not otherwise be defined by means of 'truth' tables). |
20225 | For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski] |
Full Idea: In internalist theories the grounds for justification are accessible to the believer, and Gettier problems arise when there is nothing wrong with the internally accessible aspects of the situation, but there is a mishap inaccessible to the believer. | |
From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 3.1) | |
A reaction: I'm sure we could construct an internal mishap which the believer was unaware of, such as two confusions of the meanings of words cancelling one another out. |
20226 | Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski] |
Full Idea: As long as the concept of knowledge closely connects the justification component and the truth component but permits some degree of independence between them, justified true belief will never be sufficient for knowledge. | |
From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 3.1) | |
A reaction: Out of context this sounds like an advertisement for externalism. Or maybe it just says we have to live with Gettier threats. Zagzebski has other strategies. |
20228 | We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski] |
Full Idea: The way to avoid the Gettier problem is to define knowledge in such a way that truth is entailed by the other component(s) of the definition. | |
From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 3.1) | |
A reaction: Thus she defines virtuous justification as being successful, as virtues tend to be. This smacks of cheating. Surely we can be defeated in a virtuous way? If the truth is entailed then of course Gettier can be sent packing. |
20227 | Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski] |
Full Idea: The procedure for generating Gettier cases involves 'double luck': an instance of good luck cancels out an instance of bad luck. | |
From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 3.2) | |
A reaction: You can end up with the right answer in arithmetic if you make two mistakes rather than one. I'm picturing a life of one blundering error after another, which to an outsider seems to be going serenely well. |
20194 | Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski] |
Full Idea: I argue that intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue. | |
From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II Intro) | |
A reaction: This contrasts with Sosa, who seems to think intellectual virtues are just the most efficient ways of reaching the truth. I like Zabzebski's approach a lot, though we are in a very small minority. I love her book. We have epistemic and moral duties. |
20206 | Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski] |
Full Idea: Maybe the intellectual and the moral forms of prejudice are the same vice, and this may also be true of other traits with shared names, such as humility, autonomy, integrity, perseverance, courage and trustworthiness. | |
From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 3.1) | |
A reaction: I find this claim very persuasive. The virtue of 'integrity' rather obviously embraces groups of both intellectually and morally desirable traits. |
20208 | We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski] |
Full Idea: Some examples of intellectual vices: pride, negligence, idleness, cowardice, conformity, carelessness, rigidity, prejudice, wishful thinking, closed-mindedness, insensitivity to detail, obtuseness (in seeing relevance), and lack of thoroughness. | |
From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 3.1) | |
A reaction: There are thousands of vices for which we don't have names, like thinking about football when you should be doing metaphysics. The other way round is also a vice too, because football needs concentration. Discontent with your chair is bad too. |
20210 | A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski] |
Full Idea: It is not enough that a process is reliable; a person will not reliably use such a process without certain virtues. | |
From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 4.1.2) | |
A reaction: This is a point against Sosa's reliabilist account of virtues. Of course, all theories of epistemic justification (or of morality) will fail if people can't be bothered to implement them. |
20215 | A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski] |
Full Idea: A justified belief is what a person who is motivated by intellectual virtue, and who has the understanding of his cognitive situation a virtuous person would have, might believe in like circumstances. | |
From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 6.1) | |
A reaction: This is a whole-hearted definition of justification in terms of a theory of intellectual virtues. Presumably this would allow robots to have justified beliefs, if they managed to behave the way intellectually virtuous persons would behave. |
20187 | Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski] |
Full Idea: Just as a utility-calculating machine would be the ideal moral agent according to utilitarianism, a truth-producing machine would be the ideal epistemic agent according to reliabilism, | |
From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], I 1.2) | |
A reaction: Love this one! For consequentialists a successful robot is morally superior to an average human being. The reliabilist dream is just something that churns out truths. But what is the role of these truths in subsequent life? |
6593 | The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: The attacks of the Pyrrhonian sceptics are directed against the dogmas of the 'professors', not against the beliefs of the common people pursuing the business of daily life. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
A reaction: This may be because they thought that ordinary people were too confused to be worth attacking, rather than because they lived in a state of beautifully appropriate beliefs. Naïve realism is certainly worth attacking. |
6592 | Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: The ancient Academic sceptics charged the Pyrrhonian sceptics with 'negative dogmatism' when they claimed that a certain kind of knowledge is impossible. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
A reaction: It is this kind of point which should push us towards some sort of rationalism, because certain a priori 'dogmas' seem to be indispensable to get any sort of discussion off the ground. The only safe person is Cratylus (see Idea 578). |
1801 | Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: First mode: animals vary in their feelings and judgements (of food, for example). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1802 | Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Second mode: individual men vary in responses and feelings (heat and cold, for example). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1807 | Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Seventh mode: perception varies according to viewing distance and angle (the sun, and a dove's neck). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1810 | Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Tenth mode: perceptions and judgements depend on comparison (light/heavy, above/below). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1805 | Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Fifth mode: judgements vary according to local custom, law and culture (Persians marry their daughters). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1808 | Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Eighth mode: perceptions of things depend on their magnitude or quantity (food and wine). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1804 | Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Fourth mode: perceivers vary in their mental and physical state (such as the mad and the sick). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1806 | Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Sixth mode: the perception of an object depends on surrounding conditions (sunlight and lamplight). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1803 | Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Third mode: things like an apple vary according to which sense perceives them (yellow, sweet, and fragrant). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1809 | Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Ninth mode: we perceive things according to what we expect (earthquakes and sunshine). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |