Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Walking the Tightrope of Reason', 'On the Heavens' and 'The Fixation of Belief'

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10 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
6589 Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: In general a knowledge claim is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
     A reaction: The problem here is what is 'relevant'. Fogelin's example is 'Are you sure the suspect doesn't have a twin brother?' If virtual reality is relevant, most knowledge is defeated. Certainly, imaginative people feel that they know less than others.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
6598 We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
     Full Idea: It is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5
     A reaction: This very sensible and interesting remark hovers somewhere between empiricism and pragmatism. Fogelin very persuasively builds his account of knowledge on it. The key point is that we hardly ever choose what to believe. See Idea 2454.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6944 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
     Full Idea: It is a common idea that demonstration must rest on indubitable propositions, either first principles of a general nature, or first sensations; but actual demonstration is completely satisfactory if it starts from propositions free from all actual doubt.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
     A reaction: Another nice example of Peirce focusing on the practical business of thinking, rather than abstract theory. I agree with this approach, that explanation and proof do not aim at perfection and indubitability, but at what satisfies a critical mind.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
6596 For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: Coherentists argue that if the circle of justifications is big enough, rich enough, coherent enough, and so on, then there is nothing wrong circularity.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
     A reaction: There must always be something wrong with circularity, and no god would put up with it, but we might have to. Of course, two pieces of evidence might be unconnected, such as an equation and an observation.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
6948 Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
     Full Idea: To satisfy our doubts it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.18)
     A reaction: This may be the single most important idea in pragmatism and in the philosophy of science. See Fodor on experiments (Idea 2455). Put the question to nature. The essential aim is to be passive in our beliefs - just let reality form them.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
6597 A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: One rule for the justification of knowledge might be: Do not raise the level of scrutiny in the absence of a particular reason that triggers it.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
     A reaction: That won't decide the appropriate level of scrutiny from which to start. One of my maxims is 'don't set the bar too high', but it seems tough that one should have to justify moving it. The early scientists tried raising it, and were amazed by the results.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
6588 Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: The three forms of scepticism are cartesian, Humean and Pyrrhonian. The first challenges belief by inventing sceptical scenarios; the second doubts the future; the third aims to suspend belief.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
     A reaction: A standard distinction is made between methodological and global scepticism. The former seems to be Cartesian, and the latter Pyrrhonian. The interest here is see Hume placed in a distinctive category, because of his views on induction.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6945 Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
     A reaction: This is the way Peirce's pragmatism, which deals with how real thinking actually works (rather than abstract logic), deals with scepticism. However, there is a borderline where almost everyone is satisfied, but the very wise person remains sceptical.
6590 Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: Sceptical scenarios deal in wildly remote defeating possibilities, so that the level of scrutiny becomes unrestrictedly high, and they also usually deal with defeators that are in principle ineliminable.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
     A reaction: The question of how high we 'set the bar' seems to me central to epistemology. There is clearly an element of social negotiation involved, centring on what is appropriate. If, though, scepticism is 'ineliminable', we must face up to that.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
6583 Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: We reach radical perspectivism by replacing Kant's single, necessary categorial scheme with a plurality of competing categorial schemes.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3)
     A reaction: It certainly looks as if Kant sent us down a slippery slope into the dafter aspects of twentieth century relativism. The best antidote I know of is Davidson's (e.g. Idea 6398). But then it seems unimaginative to say that only one scheme is possible.