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Ideas for 'works', 'In Defence of Pure Reason' and 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism'

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6 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour]
     Full Idea: A priori justification can vary in degree.
     From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §4.5)
     A reaction: This idea, which I trace back at least to Russell, seems to me one of breakthrough ideas in modern thought. It means that a priori knowledge can be reconnected with a posteriori knowledge.
A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour]
     Full Idea: A proposition will count as being justified a priori as long as no appeal to experience is needed for the proposition to be justified - once it is understood.
     From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §1.2)
     A reaction: Could you 'understand' that a square cannot be circular without appeal to experience? I'm losing faith in the pure a priori.
You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour]
     Full Idea: Moderate empiricists try unsuccessfully to explain a priori justification by means of analyticity, and radical empiricist attempts to dispense with a priori justification end in nearly total scepticism.
     From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §4.1)
     A reaction: My working theory is neither of the above. Because we can abstract from the physical world, we can directly see/experience generalised (and even necessary) truths about it.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour]
     Full Idea: The attempt to prove physical statements on the basis of sensory evidence is defeated by the problem of induction.
     From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.6)
     A reaction: This sounds like a logician's use of the word 'prove', which would be a pretty forlorn hope. Insofar as experience proves anything, fully sensing a chair proves its existence.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour]
     Full Idea: An externalist theory of epistemic justification or warrant need not involve the possession by the believer of anything like a reason for thinking that their belief is true.
     From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.7)
     A reaction: That is the problem with externalism. If the believer does not have a reason, then why would they believe? Externalists are interesting on justification, but daft about belief. Why do I believe I know something, when I can't recall how I learnt it?
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour]
     Full Idea: If externalism is the final story, we have no reason to think that any of our beliefs are true, which amounts to a very strong and intuitively implausible version of scepticism.
     From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.7)
     A reaction: A very good point. I may, like a cat, know many things, with good external support, but as soon as I ask sceptical questions, I sink without trace if I lack internal reasons.