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2 ideas
19524 | We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman] |
Full Idea: Our limited cognitive capacities lead Goldman to deny a principle instructing people to believe all the logical consequences of their beliefs, since they are unable to have the infinite number of beliefs that following such a principle would require. | |
From: E Conee / R Feldman (Evidentialism [1985], 'Doxastic') | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound like much of an objection to epistemic closure, which I took to be the claim that you know the 'known' entailments of your knowledge. |
3857 | Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: The challenge of incommensurability can be met once it is realised that in comparing theories the notions of truth and reference are more important than that of meaning. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.6) |