Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Against Coherence' and 'Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd)'
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13 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6353
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People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
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6361
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Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
6357
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Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
6363
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Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
6365
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Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
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21515
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Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
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21514
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Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
6354
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Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
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6367
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Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
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21496
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Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
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21499
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Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
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21502
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A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
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21512
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Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
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