Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Metaphysics', 'Causal Relations' and 'Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd)'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
17 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
|
6371
|
Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
|
6373
|
Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
|
6353
|
People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
|
|
6361
|
Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
|
6357
|
Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
|
583
|
The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
|
6363
|
Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
|
6365
|
Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
|
6354
|
Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
|
|
6367
|
Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
|
6370
|
Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
|
6358
|
One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
|
581
|
Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
|
6364
|
We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
|
584
|
If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle]
|
|
585
|
If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
|
576
|
If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle]
|