Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Metaphysics', 'On Certainty' and 'The Nature of Thought'

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7 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle]
If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle]