Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Metaphysics', 'Frege philosophy of mathematics' and 'Epistemic Norms'

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13 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
8811 What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
8817 Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8814 Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8823 Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
583 The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8813 If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
8812 Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock]
8816 Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
8815 Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
581 Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
585 If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle]
584 If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
576 If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle]