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'Metaphysics', 'Problems of Knowledge' and 'works'
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23 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
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3564
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Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
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3595
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What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
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3580
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Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
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3578
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Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
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583
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The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
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3576
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Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M]
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3577
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Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
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3589
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Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M]
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3590
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Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
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3574
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Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M]
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3571
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Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
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3569
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In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
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3567
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How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
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3586
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Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
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3573
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Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
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3565
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Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
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3566
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We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
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3594
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Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
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3575
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Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
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581
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Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
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584
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If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle]
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585
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If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
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576
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If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle]
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