Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Metaphysics', 'Brandom on Social Practices and Representations' and 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal'
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7 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
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19567
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The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
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583
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The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
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19570
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Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
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581
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Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
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585
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If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle]
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584
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If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
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576
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If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle]
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