Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Fixation of Belief', 'Internalism Exposed' and 'Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist'
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14 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
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3752
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Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
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6871
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We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman]
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6872
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Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman]
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6874
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Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
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6598
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We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
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3753
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Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
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6944
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Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
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3754
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Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
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6873
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Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
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6948
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Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
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3755
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Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
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6875
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Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
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6945
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Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
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3761
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Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske]
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