Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Fixation of Belief', 'The Varieties of Reference' and 'Knowledge by Agreement'
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7 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
6598
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We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6944
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Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
10339
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Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
10331
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Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch]
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10338
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The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
10340
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Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch]
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10345
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Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch]
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