Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Fixation of Belief', 'Apology for Raymond Sebond' and 'The Case against Closure (and reply)'
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12 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
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Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske]
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We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske]
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Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske]
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Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske]
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The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske]
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P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske]
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We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
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We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
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Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
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Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
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Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
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Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
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