Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Fixation of Belief', 'Morality, Action, and Outcome' and 'Evidentialism'
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8 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
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We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
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We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag]
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Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag]
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Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
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Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
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Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
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Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
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Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
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