Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Fixation of Belief', 'The Theory of Epistemic Rationality' and 'The Case for Closure'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551
|
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
|
19552
|
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
|
19554
|
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19708
|
Rational internal belief is conviction that a proposition enhances a belief system [Foley, by Vahid]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
6598
|
We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6944
|
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
6948
|
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6945
|
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
|