Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'The Theory of Epistemic Rationality' and 'The Case for Closure'

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4 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Rational internal belief is conviction that a proposition enhances a belief system [Foley, by Vahid]