Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Fixation of Belief', 'The Philosophy of Philosophy' and 'Evidence'
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10 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
6598
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We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
19687
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Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
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19684
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Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
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19688
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Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
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19686
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Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
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19680
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Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
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19681
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If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
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19689
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Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19683
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Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6944
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Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
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