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Ideas for
'Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects', 'Truth and the Past' and 'A Version of Internalist Foundationalism'
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6 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
8896
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Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
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My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour]
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Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour]
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Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
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Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
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If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour]
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