Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Against Coherence', 'The Case for Closure' and 'fragments/reports'

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14 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
21515 Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
21514 Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
21496 Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
21499 Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
21502 A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
21512 Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
577 Democritus says there is either no truth, or it is concealed from us [Democritus, by Aristotle]
20895 We actually know nothing, and opinions are mere flux [Democritus]
1528 We in fact know nothing, but we each restructure our reality with beliefs [Democritus]
492 It is obviously impossible to understand the reality of each thing [Democritus]
515 We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss [Democritus]