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'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd ed 1977)' and 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal'
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2 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567
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The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570
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Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
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