Combining Texts
Ideas for
'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Virtues of the Mind' and 'Problems of Knowledge'
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28 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
3564
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Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
20225
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For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski]
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20226
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Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski]
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20228
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We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski]
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20227
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Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
20194
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Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski]
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20206
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Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski]
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20208
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We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski]
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20215
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A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski]
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20210
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A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
3595
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What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
3580
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Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
3578
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Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
3576
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Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M]
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3577
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Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
3589
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Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M]
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3590
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Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3571
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Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M]
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3574
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Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3569
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In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
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3567
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How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
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3586
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Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
3573
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Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
20187
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Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski]
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3565
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Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
3566
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We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3594
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Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
3575
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Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M]
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