Combining Texts

Ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Virtues of the Mind' and 'Defeasibility Theory'

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16 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19717 Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
19716 Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
19715 You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
19713 Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
19714 Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
20225 For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski]
20226 Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski]
20228 We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski]
20227 Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
20194 Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski]
20206 Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski]
20208 We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski]
20215 A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski]
20210 A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
19719 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
20187 Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski]