Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Thinking About Mathematics', 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal' and 'Relativism'
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7 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
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Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
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The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
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Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
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Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
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Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
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Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
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Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady]
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