Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Philosophy of Philosophy', 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning' and 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal'

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4 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility

19567

The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

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In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]

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Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism

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Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]