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15286
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Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
Clavius' Paradox shows that a theorem-like structure organised by entailments cannot be identified as a scientific explanation by reference to syntactical criteria, since it shares its syntactic criteria with many other theorem-like structures.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.3)
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A reaction:
I think I was pretty convinced that a scientific theory had to meet more than mere syntactic criteria, before I encountered this idea. Lewis's account of laws may have to face this objection.
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15283
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Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
Whatever simplicity criterion is chosen for theories, it can at best sort out strata of explanations of equal simplicity, each stratum containing infinitely many items.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.I)
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A reaction:
[They cite Katz 1962 for this] This sounds to me like a purely technical result, where pragmatics would narrow the plausible theories right down. The 'Paradox of Clavius' is behind the idea (with an infinity of possible middle terms).
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15316
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The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
The marvellous success in science of the powers/natures formula as a guide to research naturally leads to an attempt at a universal application of such a powerful schema. The electric and magnetic and gravitational fields are known by their powers.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.III)
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A reaction:
This is a wonderfully heroic, and accurate, opposition to the prevailing accounts of science when they wrote. The laws, processes and equations of science and just part of a description of the natures and basic powers of what exists.
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15298
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We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
There are competitive models of the nature of things and materials, and that one is chosen which is successful in explaining the most powers and capacities of particulars and in leading to the discovery of hitherto unsuspected powers and capacities.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.III)
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A reaction:
If the powers and capacities are what get explained, what exactly does the explaining? If you says 'essences', you then have to characterise essences in some other way. I vote for basic powers as primitive. - but Idea 15302.
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