display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
6775 | Induction is inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law [Bird] |
Full Idea: Induction can be seen as inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I like this. I increasingly think of explanation as central to rational thought, as the key route for empiricists to go beyond their immediate and verifiable experience. Laws can be probabilistic. |
6790 | Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that [Bird] |
Full Idea: Whatever could do the job of justifying an inference from the observed to the unobserved must itself be an inference from the observed to the unobserved. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: We must first accept that the unobserved might not be like the observed, no matter how much regularity we have, so it can't possibly be a logical 'inference'. Essences generate regularities, but non-essences may not. |
6791 | If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge [Bird] |
Full Idea: If Hume is right about induction then there is no scientific knowledge. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: The first step is to recognise that induction is not deductively valid, but that does not make it irrational. If something happens five times, get ready for the sixth. If we discover the necessary features of nature, we can predict the future. |
6738 | Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates [Bird] |
Full Idea: It looks as if any claim about the future can be made to be a conclusion of an inductive argument from any premises about the past, as long as we use a strange enough grue-like predicate. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Intro) | |
A reaction: So don't use strange grue-like predicates. If all our predicates randomly changed their reference each day, we would be unable to talk to one another at all. Emeralds don't change their colour-properties, so why change the predicates that refer to them? |
6739 | Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses [Bird] |
Full Idea: If someone were to observe beech trees every day over one summer they would have evidence that seems to support both the hypothesis that beech trees are deciduous and the hypothesis that they are evergreens. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Intro) | |
A reaction: Bird offers this to anyone who (like me) is tempted to dismiss the 'grue' problem as ridiculous. Obviously he is right; 'deciduous' works like 'grue'. But we invented the predicate 'deciduous' to match an observed property. |
6799 | We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds [Bird] |
Full Idea: We know what natural kinds there are by seeing which properties appear in the laws of nature. But one lesson of Goodman's problem is that we cannot identify the laws of nature without some prior identification of natural kinds. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: For Goodman's problem, see Idea 4783. The essentialist view is that the natural kinds come first, and the so-called 'laws' are just regularities in events that arise from the interaction of stable natural kinds. (Keep predicates and properties separate). |
6798 | Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works [Bird] |
Full Idea: Keen supporters of Bayesianism say it can show how induction is rational and can lead to truth, and it can reveal the underlying structure of actual scientific reasoning. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: See Idea 2798 for Bayes' Theorem. I find it intuitively implausible that our feeling for probabilities could be reduced to precise numbers, given the subjective nature of the numbers we put into the equation. |