display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
18614 | Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery] |
Full Idea: Vertical arguments for eliminativism of theoretical terms note that distinct types of generalisation do not line up with each other. ...It is argued that the theoretical term picks out more than one natural kind. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.2.3) | |
A reaction: He mentions 'depression', as behavioural and cognitive; the former includes apes, and the latter doesn't. It is a nice principle for tidying up theories. |
18615 | Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery] |
Full Idea: Horizontal arguments for eliminativism of theoretical terms say that some terms should be eliminated if they do not pick out a natural kind. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.2.3) | |
A reaction: This is the one Machery likes, but I would say that it is less obvious than the 'vertical' version, since picking out a natural kind may not be the only job of a theoretical term. (p.238: Machery agrees!) |
18616 | If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery] |
Full Idea: If a hypothesised natural kind term fails to pick out a natural kind, keeping this theoretical term is likely to prevent the development of a new classification system that would identify the relevant kinds. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.2.3) | |
A reaction: I'm persuaded. This is why metaphysicians should stop talking about 'properties'. |
18609 | Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery] |
Full Idea: Typically, psychologists use 'induction' to refer to the capacity to generalise a property from a category (the source) to another category (the target). | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 7.1.1) | |
A reaction: This is because psychologists are interested in the ongoing activities of thought. Philosophers step back a bit, to ask how the whole thing could get started. Philosophical induction has to start with individuals and single observations. |
18610 | 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery] |
Full Idea: Induction is 'ampliative' when it infers that all or most members of a category possess a property from the fact that some of its members have this property. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 7.1.1) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a simple step in reasoning, but actually it is more like explanation, and will involve overall coherence and probability, rather than a direct conclusion. This invites sceptical questions. The last one observed may be the exception. |