display all the ideas for this combination of texts
13 ideas
| 12309 | There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is not even possible for there to be a science of the accidental, ...for any field of science is either 'always' or 'for the most part'. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1065b30-) | |
| A reaction: His example of an accident (and thus outside of any science) is a cold spell in high summer. This leaves us trying to explain the unusually tame tiger. Copi comments (p.717), rightly I think, that modern science disagrees with Aristotle on this. |
| 11386 | Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There cannot be demonstrations that this particular triangle is equal to the sum of two right angles, except that every triangle is equal to the sum of two right angles, nor that this particular man is an animal, except that every man is an animal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1086b36) | |
| A reaction: Not quite the covering-law model, but well on the way. Why can't we demonstrate that this particular is different from the others? This tiger is docile; this butterfly stings. We just like generalisations because you know more with less effort. |
| 16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
| Full Idea: Inductions are not demonstrations, because they do not conclude on account of their form, since it is not possible to make an induction from all cases. | |
| From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3 | |
| A reaction: Thus showing that demonstration really is meant to be as conclusive as a mathematical proof, and that Aristotle seems to think such a thing is possible in physical science. |
| 16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
| Full Idea: Induction should be regarded as a principle of natural science. For otherwise you could not prove that every fire is hot, that all rhubarb is purgative of bile, that every magnet attracts iron. | |
| From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3 | |
| A reaction: He is basing this on Aristotle, and refers to 'Physics' 190a33-b11. |
| 11385 | Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If the principles are universal, they will not be primary beings [ousiai], ...but if the principles are not universal but of the nature of particulars, they will not be scientifically knowable. For scientific knowledge of any thing is universal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1003a08) | |
| A reaction: Part of the fifteenth aporia (puzzle) of this book. Plato goes for the universal (and hence knowable), but Aristotle makes the particular primary, and so is left with an epistemological problem, which the rest of 'Metaphysics' is meant to solve. |
| 11289 | Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Understanding moves from things less intelligible by nature to things more so. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029b02) | |
| A reaction: The interesting phrase is 'by nature'. Whether things are intelligible or not is a feature of the natural world, and not just a feature of the mind's capacities. |
| 11246 | Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: The search for explanation as Aristotle conceives it is the search for the correct way to distinguish things into natural kinds, which may involve revising our initial conceptions. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], kind) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.2 | |
| A reaction: Nowadays we would make the huge addition of objects and processes which are invisible to the naked eye, which Aristotle probably never envisaged. He is interested in categories, but we are also interested in mechanisms. |
| 11384 | We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is when we know what a man is or what fire is that we reckon that we know a particular item in the fullest sense, rather than when we merely know its quality, quantity or location. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1028a36) | |
| A reaction: The word 'what' should usually be taken to indicate that Aristotle is talking about essence (as V. Politis confirms of this passage). This idea is a key one for the claim that Aristotelian essences are essentially (sic) explanatory. |
| 16135 | Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Real enquiries stand revealed as causal enquiries (and the cause is the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [to ti en einai]). | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041a28) | |
| A reaction: As good a quotation as any for showing that Aristotelian essences exist entirely by their role in explanation. |
| 16105 | We know a thing when we grasp its essence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We have knowledge of each thing when we grasp the what-it-was-to-be [to ti en einai] that thing. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1031b08) | |
| A reaction: This is a key remark in my understanding of the whole business of essentialism. It really concerns the way in which we are able to grasp reality, rather than how it is in itself. It is not mere convention, because the grasping responds to the reality. |
| 11296 | The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The explanation [aition - cause] that is the object of enquiry is that by virtue of which the matter is in the state that it is in. And this cause [explanation] is the form, and the form the substance [ousia]. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b08) | |
| A reaction: A key sentence, I think, for understanding Aristotle's whole enterprise. The explanation is the essence; the essence is what explains. |
| 11999 | Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle makes it clear that properties which belong essentially to anything have explanatory power vis-à-vis the other properties of things of that kind. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], props) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
| A reaction: This means that explanation will always occur at the level of generalisation, leading to what we call 'laws', but some events are only explicable at the level of the individual. |
| 12737 | Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: All the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by final causes, exactly as if there were no efficient causes; and all the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by efficient causes, as if there were no final causes. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1403), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6 | |
| A reaction: Somewhat speculative (a virtue!), but it is interesting to see him suggesting that there might be two complete and satisfactory explanations, which never touched one another. I can't see Aristotle agreeing with that. |