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Ideas for 'Topics', 'Attack Upon Christendom' and 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion'

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3 ideas

14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Induction is the progress from particulars to universals; if the skilled pilot is the best pilot and the skilled charioteer the best charioteer, then, in general, the skilled man is the best man in any particular sphere.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 105a15)
     A reaction: It is a bit unclear whether we are deriving universal concepts, or merely general truths. Need general truths be absolute or necessary truths? Presumably occasionally the best person is not the most skilled, as in playing a musical instrument.
If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
     Full Idea: If some inductive rule is basic for us, in the sense that we never assess it using any rules other than itself, then it must be one that we treat as empirically indefeasible (hence as fully a priori, given that it will surely have default status).
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 4)
     A reaction: This follows on from Field's account of a priori knowledge. See Ideas 9160 and 9164. I think of induction as simply learning from experience, but if experience goes mad I will cease to trust it. (A rationalist view).
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: When it is necessary to establish the universal, people use the expression 'So in all cases of this kind'; but it is one of the most difficult tasks to define which of the terms proposed are 'of this kind' and which are not.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 157a25)
     A reaction: It is particularly hard if induction is expressed as the search for universals, since the kind presumably is the universal, so the universal must be known before the induction can apply, which really is the most frightful nuisance for truth-seekers.